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Abstract. Physics Education Research (PER) applies a scientific approach to the question, “How do our students think 
about and learn physics?” PER allows us to explore such intellectually engaging questions as, “What does it mean to un-
derstand something in physics?” and, “What skills and competencies do we want our students to learn from our physics 
classes?” To address questions like these, we need to do more than observe student difficulties and build curricula. We 
need a theoretical framework – a structure for talking about, making sense of, and modeling how one thinks about, 
learns, and understands physics. In this paper, I outline some aspects of the Resources Framework, a structure that some 
of us are using to create a phenomenology of physics learning that ties closely to modern developments in neuroscience, 
psychology, and linguistics. As an example of how this framework gives new insights, I discuss epistemological framing 
— the role of students’ perceptions of the nature of the knowledge they are learning and what knowledge is appropriate 
to bring to bear on a given task. I discuss how this foothold idea fits into our theoretical framework, show some class-
room data on how it plays out in the classroom, and give some examples of how my awareness of the resources frame-
work influences my approach to teaching. 
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I. PREAMBLE 
After 20 years as a physics education researcher, I am 
honored to be added to the distinguished list of Oersted 
medalists, especially since so many of them have in-
spired my thinking over many years. My work over these 
decades has also been and continues to be facilitated, 
guided, and enriched by many other mentors, colleagues, 
and students, too many to name here.  
In this paper, I want to convince you of two ideas that 
have emerged from and motivated my research for the 
past two decades:  
(1) There is value in having a theoretical framework for 
physics education research.  
(2) One value of such a framework is learning to appre-
ciate the importance of mental control structures 
such as expectations, framing, and selective atten-
tion in making sense of what might first appear as 
students’ lack of knowledge. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I discuss 
what I mean by a theoretical framework by giving three 
examples from our familiar sciences. In section 3, I mo-
tivate why physics education research (PER) needs a 
theoretical framework based in the psychological scienc-
es. In section 4, I walk you through a few simple exper-
iments that you can do yourself to demonstrate some of 
the fundamental principles on which the framework is 
built. In section 5, I introduce some of the basic princi-
ples of our Resources Framework. In section 6, I discuss 
some examples of how these results play out in a class-
room; and, in section 7, I discuss some implications for 
instruction and research. 
II. WHAT’S A  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK? 
A growing number of scientists have been turning their 
attention to studying how their students learn a scientific 
discipline – and how they don’t. These researchers want 
to figure out how to do a more effective job teaching 
their students, and to do that, they need to better under-
stand what it means to understand science. This requires 
a deep understanding of the science, so this kind of re-
search is often carried out by disciplinary scientists, and 
their research field is referred to as discipline-based edu-
cational research (DBER).1 Physics education research 
(PER) is perhaps the oldest and (presently) the best es-
tablished of the DBER disciplines.2,3 AAPT’s Physics 
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Education Research (PER) Topical Group currently has 
more than 750 members – physicists interested in the use 
of a scientific approach to study the teaching and learn-
ing of physics, and the APS has just recently created 
their own PER topical group. 
There are typically three complementary approaches that 
comprise any science: observation (experiment), practice 
(engineering), and mechanism (theory). They intertwine, 
inform each other, and provide mutual support. They are 
like the legs of a three-legged stool, and, as we all know 
well, the most important leg of a three-legged stool is the 
one that’s missing. In PER we have a tendency to focus 
on observation and practice: How do we see our students 
behaving and how can we figure out how to teach them 
more effectively? But Eddington reminds us: 
It is also a good rule not to put overmuch confidence 
in the observational results that are put forward 
until they are confirmed by theory.4 
While this sounds like a strange transformation of the 
usual, “Don’t believe any theory until it’s been con-
firmed by experiment,” it has a solid grain of truth. Until 
we have a way of making sense of, organizing, and un-
derstanding our observations, we may well misunder-
stand what those observations have to tell us. 
The issue of how to build a coherent mental picture (the-
ory) of what happens in a student and a classroom is the 
missing leg of our three-legged stool. While many edu-
cational theories exist, they are often narrow prescrip-
tions that offer heuristics for improving instruction. We 
need something that can providing a structure for inter-
preting observations, for developing and testing models 
that can grow and accumulate knowledge scientifically, 
and can guide the creation of appropriate methodologies. 
Part of the challenge in building educational theory is 
that learning is a human behavior and human behavior is 
extremely complex. At this stage, we cannot expect to 
have anything like a complete theory. But it is clear that 
whatever we do, we have to consider how thinking 
works (cognition) and how individuals interact with the 
context and cultures around them (situational and socio-
cultural interactions). If we don’t yet know enough about 
how these work, what can we do? Just as we have done 
in many areas of science, we create a theoretical frame-
work that allows us to build descriptive models and that 
can evolve and change as we learn more.5,6,7 
When we teach physics, at least before graduate school, 
we focus our instruction on well-developed theories. 
These come with well-established models – touchstone 
examples – that are often viewed as integral parts of the 
theory, since they show how the theory works and is 
applied. When we are trying to establish a new theoreti-
cal framework, it is useful to separate the “bones of the 
framework” – the basic assumptions of what kind of 
things we are talking about and their nature (the ontology 
of the theory) – from the specific models and examples 
that “flesh out the framework”. In order to clarify what I 
mean by a theoretical framework, let me turn to exam-
ples that we can pull apart to find the frameworks: New-
tonian mechanics, quantum field theory, and evolution. 
Framework 1: Newtonian Mechanics 
Newtonian mechanics is the theoretical framework that 
was developed to describe motion on the human level, 
but it turns out to work over a huge range of phenomena, 
from molecules to galaxies. Newton’s three laws provide 
the framework, implicitly establishing an ontology.  
The first law 
An object at rest tends to remain at rest; an object 
in motion tends to maintain its velocity unless act-
ed upon by unbalanced forces. 
tells us that mechanics is about objects and interactions 
with other objects (forces). It also tells us how to de-
scribe an object: specify its position and its velocity. 
These variables establish the dynamic parameter space in 
which the object is situated.  
The second law  
     
reaffirms that we are talking about objects (the subscript 
“A”), tells us how the forces the object feels are to be 
combined (the vector symbol and the superscript “net”), 
and what characteristic of the object we need to know in 
order to understand how the interactions change the ve-
locity (the object’s mass). The third law  
    
tells us that forces that act between objects are interac-
tions and constrained (by consistency conditions) to be 
mutual.  
This is more complicated than it looks. In the Newtonian 
framework, each object gets a Newton’s second law 
equation of its own. The connection between objects is 
made through the forces. In principle, we have to solve 
Eqs. (1.1) for all the objects we are considering at the 
same time. In practice, we often make easier-to-handle 
models. For example we might consider the earth as ef-
fectively infinite in extent (“flat-earth gravity”) when we 
consider falling bodies. Or we may consider the sun as 
being fixed in space when we model the motion of the 
solar system.  
Every example we consider in Newtonian mechanics is a 
model in the Newtonian framework — an approximation 
in which many real-world factors have been ignored. 
Since the framework is about objects and their positions 
as a function of time, it’s natural and convenient to start 
with models that restrict the number of variables we 
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have to deal with – such as ones that contain point mass-
es or rigid bodies. 
No one has ever seen a point mass or a rigid body, but 
they are useful if we carefully limit the situations in 
which we apply them. No one has ever seen a spring that 
can be either stretched or compressed by arbitrary 
amounts and that responds with anything remotely like a 
linear relation – except when the deformation is severely 
restricted to a limited range, but Hooke’s-law models 
serve as excellent starting points for making sense of any 
kind of oscillation – and even as starting points for mod-
els in other frameworks, such as the description of the 
electromagnetic field in quantum field theory. The New-
tonian framework is not the models we use it for. It is far 
more reliable than any specific model. When our models 
fail, we first attempt to modify the model, not the 
framework.8 
Framework 2: Quantum Field Theory 
When we get down to sub-atomic and sub-nuclear phe-
nomena we need a different framework: quantum field 
theory (QFT).9 Because of the small scale and the high 
speeds involved in sub-nuclear reactions, quantum me-
chanics has to be combined with special relativity in 
order to guarantee that all signals propagate at the speed 
of light or slower. As a result, we can include no rigid 
objects of finite size. Everything has to be described in 
terms of point masses and interactions that propagate at a 
finite speed.10  
The ontological structures established by this theoretical 
framework are quantum fields and their states, some-
thing very different from localized objects. These fields 
are functions of space and time that describe the proba-
bility of finding a particle at a particular point at a par-
ticular time. The “kind of thing” they are is specified by 
how they change when we change the perspectives and 
arbitrary choices we have. (This requires that we pay 
attention to group theory. How the fields change speci-
fies their internal angular momentum, or spin, and their 
quantum numbers.) Then there are interactions – scalar 
functions built by combining fields at a point to yield an 
interaction term in a Hamiltonian or Lagrangian. So the 
“objects” in this framework are fields and the “interac-
tions” are scalar products of fields.  
The QFT framework leads to model building in very 
different ways from the Newtonian. We choose mathe-
matical transformation groups, fields, and interactions to 
mount an overall “theory” (really a model). One way to 
approach classes of problems in QFT is to generate an 
infinite series using perturbation theory in which each 
term is represented by a Feynman diagram. We then 
make models of a particular phenomenon by choosing a 
subset of the diagrams that are assumed to be most rele-
vant. 
Note how the language and indeed the entire way of 
speaking differs for QFT as compared to Newtonian me-
chanics. Forces, fundamental in Newtonian mechanics, 
don’t even appear in QFT. QFT and Newtonian mechan-
ics provide different frameworks for describing different 
classes of physical phenomena. 
Framework 3: Evolution 
Other fields of science and math also establish and work 
within theoretical frameworks. Evolution is a theoretical 
framework that biologists use to explore questions about 
species, their history and genetic structure, and their rela-
tionships. It can be used for an extremely wide range of 
situations and questions ranging from the transfor-
mations of viruses on times scales of months or years to 
the transformation and development of species over mil-
lions of years. It provides insight into structure and func-
tion of biological organisms ranging from the subcellular 
to the ecological. 
Evolution is often described as a “theory”, but I like to 
describe it as a theoretical framework. It tells us what to 
pay attention to – heredity (genotype), variation, organ-
isms and their structure (phenotype), and natural selec-
tion. This encourages biologists to define species (popu-
lations that share and exchange genetic material) and to 
look at interactions between populations, such as preda-
tion, symbiosis, parasitism, etc. But for any particular 
biological question, biologists will build models within 
this theoretical framework, paying attention to what is 
most likely to be important for the description of the 
particular phenomenon – and ignoring everything else. 
For example, a model explanation of the speciation of 
Darwin’s finches focuses on beak shape and how beak 
morphology can lead to increased success in particular 
ecological niches.11 
These three examples give some indication of the value 
and power of theoretical frameworks in guiding scien-
tific understanding and progress. 
III. DO WE REALLY NEED  
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR PER/DBER? 
Despite the clear value of theoretical frameworks in sci-
entific research, DBER scientists are often reluctant to 
situate their work within a theoretical framework. I am 
sometimes told by my PER colleagues, “Why do we 
need a theory? We know physics and have experience 
learning and teaching it. I’m happy relying on that.”  
As scientists and science teachers, we may have experi-
ence practicing, teaching, and learning our science, but 
we still should be cautious in relying on our spontaneous 
interpretations about thinking and learning from every-
day experience – even from our professional experience. 
After all, from three decades of PER we have learned 
that despite having nearly 20 years living in the physical 
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world and experiencing motion and forces, students’ 
spontaneous or “folk” models12 of physics can lead them 
dramatically astray in trying to make sense of the phys-
ics they are learning.3 
In the same way, as instructors, our “folk models” about 
how people think and learn can lead us dramatically 
astray in trying to make sense of how our students are 
responding in our classes. A theoretical framework, 
while not giving all the answers, can guide our thinking, 
alert us to things we might otherwise miss, and help us 
reinterpret our folk models carefully and consistently. 
Moreover, a theoretical framework can help us formulate 
the research questions we need to explore to improve 
both our understanding of student responses and our in-
struction. A theoretical framework helps us explicate our 
tacit (often unnoticed) assumptions, test them, and modi-
fy them when needed. 
In this paper, I outline the theoretical framework of Re-
sources and discuss one detailed example of how our 
spontaneous models of thinking and learning may miss 
what our students are doing. When our students miss a 
question whose answer they should know or be able to 
work out as a result of what we have taught them, we 
typically assume that that they have failed to learn or 
understand what we have taught them. If many students 
do the same thing, or if some students repeat the same 
mistake despite repeated instruction, we may say they 
bring a misconception into our class and expect that they 
will need a strong remedial effort to fix it.  
Sometimes this is the case. However, the two-level ver-
sion of the resources theoretical framework I describe 
below, built on solid results from psychology,13,14 neuro-
science,15,16 socio-linguistics,17 and anthropology,18,19 
suggests that errors of this type can have other causes 
than failures of knowledge. As we shall see, mental re-
sponses are highly dynamic, responding not only to what 
knowledge is available, but to in-the-moment readings of 
what knowledge is relevant at that instant. So errors, 
even reliably reproducible ones, may occur not only be-
cause of lack of knowledge but also through failures in 
the moment of control structures: mismatches of situa-
tions and expectations about the task that result in stu-
dents failing to access knowledge they actually have. In 
order to understand how this works, we need to establish 
a few basic psychological results. 
IV. GROUNDING OUR FRAMEWORK  
ON BASIC PSYCHOLOGY  
The community with which I identify talks about a 
Knowledge in Pieces (KiP)20 or a Resources21 framework 
for educational theory. I prefer the latter term since it 
seems more general and less constraining, allowing the 
combining of mental “pieces” into reasonably stable 
structures. As of this writing there are many papers de-
scribing work within this framework. Check out one of 
the on-line bibliographies for a long list.22 
What's the appropriate level of description for a system 
as complex as a science classroom filled with function-
ing human brains? Despite my appreciation of the value 
of reductionism in physics, at this point I do not expect 
us to find a micro-to-macro fundamental theory that be-
gins with the basic elements of thought – neurons and 
chemicals in the brain. Rather, we are looking for a mac-
ro-level description to guide phenomenological model-
ing; something in the spirit of Newtonian mechanics of 
point masses and rigid bodies (that doesn’t require a dis-
cussion of atoms) or Kirchhoff’s principles of electric 
currents, potentials, and resistance (that doesn’t talk ex-
plicitly about electrons).23 
Because we are building a theoretical framework for 
learning, our foundational knowledge naturally comes 
from psychology and the social sciences. While many 
physical scientists are still leery of the behavioral scienc-
es, these sciences have made tremendous progress in the 
past few decades. While much uncertainty still remains, 
psychology, neuroscience, social science, linguistics, and 
sociology are beginning to converge on a model of how 
the human mind works.  
We are going to use some of the fundamental ideas from 
these disciplines as foothold principles around which to 
construct our theoretical framework. My metaphor here 
is climbing a cliff face or climbing wall. By footholds I 
mean basic principles that we can use to organize our 
thinking and move onward and upward. This phrase im-
plicitly carries a weaker claim than “laws” or “princi-
ples” and includes the implication that we may be will-
ing to retreat and modify them – choose new footholds – 
if the ones we have don’t take us where we need to go.24 
We do have to be careful in taking results from the be-
havioral sciences. In much of their research (as in the 
physical sciences) there is considerable interest in fun-
damental mechanism. As a result, many studies are what 
we in physics would call “zero friction” experiments, 
where the context has been dramatically constrained and 
simplified to illuminate some basic phenomenon. We 
know there is great value to such knowledge, but we also 
know that the real world is often dominated by friction, 
so simple experimental results need to be considered in a 
realistic context, and their relevance may change dramat-
ically as a result.  
As in building physical frameworks, we want to have a 
few basic and powerful principles that let us do a lot. But 
can we get away with this? The brain is an amazingly 
complex and flexible device, capable of creating art, 
science, and culture. In our desire to have something 
tractable and easy to work with, we have to be careful 
not to create something too simple that does not take into 
account the full possibilities of the brain’s dynamics and 
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creativity. On the other hand, we don’t want to get lost in 
trying to model the very fluid and dynamic functionality 
that appears to be the workings of the active, thinking 
brain.25 
An analogy that gives me hope and the courage to move 
ahead is the atomic shell model. Consider, for example, a 
Calcium atom. It has a nucleus and twenty electrons 
crowded into a spherical volume with diameter less than 
a nanometer. Any pair of those electrons getting as close 
to each other as half a nanometer contributes a repulsive 
energy of ~3 eV! This is a huge number on the scale of 
atomic excitations. Getting two electrons closer than that 
costs proportionately more energy. One might expect 
that the most appropriate model of an atom would have 
to be dominated by electron-electron correlations – creat-
ing a structure where the electrons move to avoid each 
other as much as possible.  
This is of course NOT what we do. We consider a model 
(the atomic shell model) where we treat one electron at a 
time, “smearing out” all the others and describing the 
motion of each electron in a mean field – the average 
field of the other smeared electrons. The result has each 
electron being independent of all the others in a quantum 
state called an atomic orbital. We mostly ignore pairwise 
electron-electron correlations. All of chemistry is based 
on this unlikely starting point! We later learn that when 
expressed in terms of these orbitals, the Pauli Principle 
drives the modifications to the atom’s wave function due 
to electron-electron interactions up to high energy and, 
as a result, down to short range justifying the model after 
the fact. 
The brain also has lots of strong stuff going on. Our 
brain allows us to store huge amounts of knowledge in 
our long-term memory.26 Interactions between those 
memories are critical, since our long-term knowledge 
store is not well indexed – it’s not even time stamped or 
location marked. We access various bits of memory and 
identify their relation to other elements (such as dates 
and places) through chains of associations. We build up 
local associational structures such as schemas, mental 
models, and blends. With so many bits, pieces, and in-
teractions, how can we possibly hope to make sense of 
what’s going on as students try to bring the large and 
complex body of scientific knowledge into their already 
complex existing structure of memory? 
I propose that the functioning of the brain also has a 
structure that suppresses much of its apparent complexi-
ty. When we use and manipulate our knowledge, every-
thing has to go through a very small structure known as 
working memory – what you hold in your mind and can 
manipulate explicitly. Before getting into details, let’s 
explore some of the critical phenomena in your own 
brain. 
Experiment 1: Limited working memory 
Our first experiment demonstrates the critical result that 
our brains have difficulty in managing tasks of too high a 
complexity at one time. For this task you will need a 
partner. Have your partner read you the following strings 
of numbers and after each one, try to quickly say them 
back in reverse order. So if your partner says “123” you 
respond “321”. Now try it with the following number 
strings:27 
• 123 
• 4629 
• 38271 
• 539264 
• 9026718 
• 43917682 
• 579318647 
Get the idea? It gets harder and harder and above a cer-
tain string length it’s impossible. (You can develop tech-
niques to do this task, but the experiments I present are 
designed to show the limitations of the untrained brain.) 
George Miller28 proposed the limit of “7 ± 2” on pro-
cessing capacity more than 50 years ago. These observa-
tions are the basis of the important psychological con-
struct of working memory – the part of your brain that 
you use to think with and that manipulates bits of the 
large store of knowledge your long-term memory con-
tains.13  
To see that this result has implications beyond this trivial 
example, take a look at A. H. Johnstone’s Brasted Lec-
ture.29 In it, he reports on a chemistry exam on the topic 
of the mole (Avogadro’s number of molecules) set by 
the Scottish examination board and given to 22,000 six-
teen-year-old students. When considered as a function of 
the sum of (1) the pieces of information given in the 
question, plus (2) the additional pieces to be recalled, 
plus (3) the number of processing steps required, student 
success shows a dramatic drop off at six pieces of infor-
mation, consistent with Miller’s hypothesis.  
Of course we all know that we can handle much more 
complex knowledge than 7 ± 2 items. One approach the 
brain uses is compilation or chunking: creating strong 
associations among clusters of related knowledge allows 
us to manipulate blocks of knowledge. Another way the 
brain extends the reach of working memory is using ex-
ternal objects as components of our working cognition, 
components like equations written on a whiteboard or 
menus in a computer program. A third technique – and 
one that can cause trouble in our classrooms – is memory 
reconstruction, as shown in our next experiment.  
Experiment 2: Reconstructive recall 
In our second experiment, consider the 24 words given 
in the list shown in Fig. 1.30 Look at them for one minute 
and try to memorize as many as possible. Don’t do any-
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thing special or organized*: just look at the words and try 
to remember as many as you can. After one minute, look 
away and try to write down as many as you can recall. 
Thread 
Thimble 
Pin 
Haystack 
Eye 
Knitting 
Sewing 
Cloth 
Sharp 
Injection 
Point 
Syringe  
Bed 
Rest 
Awake 
Tired 
Dream 
Snooze 
Blanket 
Doze 
Slumber 
Snore 
Nap 
Yawn 
Fig. 1: The list of words to try to memorize for experiment 2.  
Now look at your list. Check endnote [31] to see if you 
had either of the two test words on your list. When I give 
this task to my class, typically more than half of the stu-
dents put one or both of the test words on their list and 
are shocked to discover that they aren’t there. They were 
sure they remembered seeing them!  
This illustrates a critical principle of memory: Memory is 
not veridical. It’s not an accurate recording, but rather is 
“reconstructed” from stored bits and pieces and plausible 
stock items. A lot of psychological research supports 
this, going back to 1932.32,33 A readable modern theoret-
ical interpretation (with support from neuroscience ex-
periments) is summarized in Buckner & Carroll.34 
Experiment 3: Selective attention 
For our final experiment, you need an Internet connec-
tion. In this task, a group of six students (shown in Fig. 
2) serve as two teams, one with white shirts and one with 
black. Each team has a basketball and during the short 
video they move around quickly, passing their ball 
among members of their own team. Your task is to see 
how well you can concentrate by counting the number of 
passes among the members of the white-shirted team. 
You have to pay careful attention, since things happen 
fast! 
Go to the link 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoK_ZfY and 
maximize the screen without reading any of the text 
there (or below) until you are done. 
 
Fig. 2: Daniel Simon’s concentration task. 
                                                
* Many of you are able to construct methods that allow you to remem-
ber all these words. This kind of thinking is what we are trying to teach 
our students to do! To illustrate naïve student thinking, try to do this 
task without using any highly developed learning skills. 
Many people manage to count the number of passes suc-
cessfully, but fail to see the dramatic events and changes 
that take place during the clip that are identified at the 
end. This surprising phenomenon is called inattentional 
blindness –when you are paying attention to something 
you think is important, you may fail to notice other im-
portant things. The fact that we pay attention to some 
things and ignore others (often without conscious deci-
sion) is called selective attention.35,36  
This is the psychological core of the phenomenon that I 
refer to as framing, which is the heart of the phenomena 
about teaching and learning that I want to emphasize 
here. Let’s begin by establishing the bare bones of the 
Resources Framework and showing how it follows from 
the basic psychological principles established by our 
three experiments. As our experiments show, our brains 
can get overloaded from the complexity of a task, fail to 
reconstruct our memories correctly, and even misinter-
pret our direct perceptions. Fortunately, the brain has lots 
of tools to help us do better. 
Two useful and effective structures that help us access 
and use our knowledge are local and global associations. 
By local associations, I mean direct and immediate links 
– the kind of quick automatic connections that come up 
in free association or those kinds of connections typical-
ly drawn in a concept map.37 Clusters of local associa-
tions can form tightly bound chunks of knowledge that I 
refer to as compiled,7 or looser clusters of associations 
referred to in many areas of behavioral science as mental 
models,38 schemas,39 or coordination classes.40 These 
structures and other associated local patterns of associa-
tion are important in understanding teaching and learn-
ing.41 Compiled or tight associations are things you al-
ways associate and find hard to break apart. For people 
who are good readers, it’s difficult to see the letters 
“CAT” and not associate to one of the many meanings of 
the word. Looser patterns are ones where you may or 
may not come up with a well-known association depend-
ing on the context.  
There are lots of things to say about local associations 
and a large interesting literature about them. But in this 
paper I want to focus on equally important but less often 
discussed structures: global associations that act on and 
control our local associations. By this I mean our use of 
our knowledge about situations (especially social envi-
ronments) that we use as filters to restrict our search 
space in long-term memory. We might call them expec-
tations. Let’s see how what we did in the last section can 
help us understand how this works. 
Although huge amounts of knowledge are stored in long-
term memory, access to it is restricted by the psycholog-
ical ideas demonstrated in the experiments in section 4: 
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• Working memory – what you can hold and ma-
nipulate in your mind at any one instant – is lim-
ited.  
• Memory is often not just direct recall but is re-
constructive and dynamic. 
• Selective attention matters – a lot. 
Of course these few results don’t tell the whole story. 
(For more discussion and lots more references, see [6] 
and [7].) But they can help us begin to set up some foot-
hold ideas that have powerful implications for how we 
think about educational issues. I start with a brief outline 
of the fundamental ideas about how the brain works – 
cognition. I then discuss how broader knowledge plays a 
role in organizing thinking – especially socio-cultural 
knowledge. Finally, I tie them together through the pro-
cess by which the brain uses socio-cultural knowledge to 
restrict search spaces in cognition – framing. 
The cognitive structure 
To figure out how the brain functions dynamically, we 
need a somewhat mechanistic picture. I’ve outlined a 
model in Fig. 3. Let’s imagine that the brain is presented 
with a straightforward set of data: the perceptual signals 
associated with holding a cup of Turkish coffee. These 
include a variety of sensations: (1) visual – a pattern of 
signals arriving on the retinas of your eyes, (2) haptic – 
the sense of touch including the feel, texture, and weight 
of the cup in your hand, (3) olfactory – the smell of the 
coffee, and (4) memory – your knowledge of the cup, 
including how it tastes, what the effect of the coffee 
might be on you, and your social knowledge about how 
and when to drink it – and when to stop drinking it so 
you don’t get a mouthful of grounds. 
 
Fig. 3: Dynamical structure of the brain’s response  
to input data. 
The first step in the way the brain appears to work is that 
basic sensory data is processed to create a coherent per-
ceptual construct and activate associational knowledge. 
While it is doing this, it sends signals to the judgment 
and decision-making part of the brain, the pre-frontal 
cortex. This part of the brain accesses information from 
long-term memory to decide what to do with the data. 
This is where knowledge about the way the social world 
works is brought in.42 Selective attention (such as in ex-
periment 3) happens here and other perceptions and as-
sociations (such as in experiment 2) can now be linked to 
the original percept.15,16,43  
This model sets us up the structure for the phenomenol-
ogy that I will use to analyze and describe the role of 
context and expectations: associations and control of 
those associations. Here are two foothold ideas. 
• Associations – Activity in the brain consists of 
turning on some bit of knowledge (activation). 
This bit of knowledge links to others and sends 
out signals that tend to activate (or inhibit the 
activation of) other bits. Activation of one clus-
ter may induce activation of other clusters lead-
ing to interpretation and meaning making.44 
• Control – The brain takes data from immediate 
situations, uses it to activate generalized situa-
tional memory, which then feeds back to the 
system to control selective attention. The feed-
forward and feedback of signals to and from the 
prefrontal cortex and long-term memory acti-
vate or inhibit the activation of associational 
clusters.  
The control level is where students’ assumptions, expec-
tations, and culture draw on their broad knowledge of 
appropriate behaviors to affect what they do in our class-
rooms. To understand how to talk about this, let’s con-
sider how the behavior of an individual is imbedded in a 
socio-cultural environment and how this environment 
affects behavior. 
The socio-cultural structure 
The behavior of any human being is immensely com-
plex. It can be analyzed at multiple scales, ranging from 
the very small (how many neurons are being activated) 
to the very large, both in space and time (how does it 
depend on the presence of highly structured modern 
technology or the modern nation state). It responds to the 
individual’s knowledge of the human social world which 
comes from many sources and scales.  
I show one way of thinking of this in Fig. 4. I borrow a 
metaphor that has been used by complexity theorists as a 
metaphor for resolution or “grain size”: the staircase. 
When looking at something while standing on the bot-
tom (and looking down) you can see all the local detail 
on the ground in front of you. The higher up you are, the 
less detail you see – but you are better able to discern 
broader emergent patterns. In complexity theory, moving 
up the staircase is reductionism – explaining things at a 
larger grain size in terms of finer-grained structures. 
Moving down the staircase is emergence – organizing 
knowledge at smaller scales in terms of larger scaled 
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structures that emerge from coherences and collective 
effects (and that can be hard to understand from a reduc-
tionist perspective). I’ll refer to it as the grain-size stair-
case.  
On the finest level, we see neurons and their functioning 
– the fundamental matter of which behavior is made up. 
When we move up a step, we are led ask ourselves about 
the basic psychological mechanisms of behavior – what 
they are and how they develop. Another step up takes us 
to basic behavioral phenomenology – what individuals 
know about the physical world and how they interact 
with it. 
 
Fig. 4: The cognitive/socio-cultural grain-size staircase. 
The next step moves beyond individuals and places them 
in the context of a small group. Beyond that, we consider 
individuals’ relations to the broader local culture of the 
environment – their knowledge and experience with 
classrooms and school and their understanding of appro-
priate behavior in that context. The classroom itself then 
gets imbedded in multiple cultures – the culture of the 
discipline being taught45 and the way schooling is im-
bedded in the broader culture of the locale46 – how 
schooling tends to be viewed by other individuals in the 
society, how it relates to employment opportunities, how 
one’s position as a member of various subgroups in soci-
ety affects one’s behavior, and so on. Power relations, 
stereotypes, and other important factors come in at this 
level.  
At another step up, we might begin considering the be-
havior of groups of individuals whose function has to be 
viewed as a group. A software development corporation 
may have coherent capabilities that no individual pos-
sesses;47 a battleship may know how to navigate, but no 
single individual in the navigation team may have that 
knowledge.48  
The same idea holds for science. Scientific knowledge is 
an emergent community consensus that arises from the 
knowledge of many individuals. No single individual, no 
matter how brilliant, has knowledge that is identical to 
this community knowledge.49 
Each level is emergent from the level below it. The criti-
cal behaviors seen at a given level are a result of struc-
tures at lower levels, but how they emerge from those 
structures may be difficult to analyze. Note that the line-
ar model of the staircase is somewhat misleading. Phe-
nomena that are organized at multiple levels may affect 
each other and interact. The higher levels, which can be 
seen as emergent from the lower, feedback and constrain 
phenomena viewed at the lower levels. The metaphor 
only is meant to specify that some phenomena are most 
naturally considered at different scales; it is not meant to 
constrain how those scales interact with each other. 
The important part of this staircase analysis for us as 
science educators is that the behavior of the individual 
student in our classroom is affected – often strongly – by 
the knowledge they bring to the classroom. And their 
knowledge and perception of all the upper levels of the 
staircase can play a critical role, serving as control struc-
tures for what behaviors they engage in and what they 
avoid. I show this in the figure as arrows looping back to 
the basic behavioral level.  
In order to have a language to talk about how this works, 
I adapt the process known as framing from anthropolo-
gy50 and sociolinguistics.51 
Framing: The interaction  
of the cognitive and the cultural 
Socio-cultural effects on the classroom have been stud-
ied extensively for many decades, but often a critical 
point is not made explicit. It’s not just the socio-cultural 
environment that matters: rather, it’s a student’s percep-
tion of the socio-cultural environment that affects that 
student’s behavior.52  
This requires us to not simply look at the environment 
and interpret it through our own perceptions, but to con-
sider what socio-cultural knowledge the student brings to 
our classroom and how the student uses that knowledge. 
As in experiment 3, if our students fail to perceive what 
we have set up for them or asked them to do, it might as 
well not be there. 
The anthropologist Erving Goffman studied how people 
interpret and respond to the social environments they 
find themselves in from moment to moment.18 He sug-
gested that people are continually asking themselves the 
question (though not necessarily consciously), “What’s 
going on here?” The answer to that question controls 
(again, not necessarily consciously) what behaviors the 
individual activates. Goffman referred to the process of 
answering that question by drawing on experiences 
stored in long-term memory as framing. The concept has 
been further developed in sociolinguistics17 and in other 
fields as well.53 For a detailed discussion of how it ap-
plies in physics education, see Hammer, et al.54 
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Framing is what you did when you focused your atten-
tion on the passes in experiment 3 and as a result wound 
up not seeing other elements that were interesting and 
possibly important. In that case, in my instructions, I 
encouraged you to frame the task as a concentration one, 
which encouraged you to ignore (or even suppress) eve-
rything else that might be happening. Similarly, prob-
lems occur in a classroom when students bring in their 
own expectations that may result in their ignoring mes-
sages that you think you are explicitly sending – expec-
tations like, “I know how a science class works. I don’t 
have to read all these pre-class handouts.”  
V. HOW THIS WORKS IN PRACTICE: 
CLASSROOM EXAMPLES OF  
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMING 
A number of broad surveys – for example the MPEX,55 
C-LASS,56 CHEMX,57 and MBEX58– probe students’ 
attitudes and epistemological expectations about what 
and how they will learn in an introductory science class. 
These consider not just students’ general attitudes about 
science, but their epistemology – what they think they 
know about the nature of scientific knowledge, but also 
their functional epistemology – what they think they 
have to do to learn that knowledge.  
Pre-post results are rather depressing. Students enter the 
class with expectations that are somewhat in accord 
with their instructor’s (about 2/3 of the time), but they 
leave it having either remained the same or deteriorat-
ed. These surveys provide a strong indication that we 
have a problem that goes beyond the well-documented 
conceptual learning difficulties that students show. 
To better understand both how students’ epistemologi-
cal expectations play out in an actual classroom envi-
ronment and how we might affect these dimensions of 
learning, we need a closer look at how students function 
in a classroom than can be provided by simple pre-post 
testing. We get this through videotaping students – both 
in semi-structured interviews59 and in classrooms where 
much of the learning takes place in a group-learning 
environment. In many of the latter situations, students 
interact with their peers in the absence of an instructor, 
for example, when working in groups to solve home-
work problems.  
These videotapes can give us insight into how control 
structures actually function to foster or hinder deep 
learning. The results discussed in this section come 
from hundreds of hours of observations with physics 
students at levels from introductory college up to grad-
uate school.  
When students are put in a situation in which they have 
to construct some knowledge – answer a question, solve 
a problem, analyze a text or experiment – they make a 
quick and dynamic decision (again, not necessarily con-
sciously) about “what is going on”. They decide how to 
restrict their search space in their long term memory – 
what knowledge they have that might be relevant to 
bring to bear and how to approach what they need to 
do. I refer to this control structure as epistemological 
framing — the process that generates each individual’s 
answer to the questions:  
What is the nature of the knowledge  
we are learning in this class  
and what do I have to do to learn it? 
Epistemological framing is the process of choosing dif-
ferent ways and tools of knowing (epistemological re-
sources) for dealing with learning situations.60,61 This 
choice of metaphor (“framing”) emphasizes the process 
aspect of the phenomenon. We can also choose to talk 
about an epistemological stance, choosing a metaphor 
that emphasizes the functional state produced by the 
framing process.62  
Epistemological framing restricts the conceptual re-
sources, associational structures, and epistemological 
resources63 that students access in a particular context. 
Some epistemological stances that we have observed 
are discussed in stories in which students are led astray 
by four identifiable epistemological framings. 
• One-step thinking – “The answer is obvious. I 
don’t have to worry about context or coher-
ence.” 
• P-priming – “The answer is obvious. I don’t 
have to worry about how it works.” 
• Rote reasoning – “I know the process to gener-
ate this answer. I don’t have to think about 
meaning.” 
• Disciplinary siloing – “Since this is a physics 
course, I don’t have to bring in any knowledge 
from chemistry.” 
While these are sometimes perfectly appropriate, in 
some situation they lead students into trouble. 
Framing 1: One-step thinking 
One of the most common inappropriate epistemological 
framings that I encounter among students in my intro-
ductory physics classes is the idea that, “I should know 
every answer right away through direct recall.” This of-
ten leads them to answer on the basis of a single remem-
bered association without thinking through what the 
question means or relating their answer to other things 
they know. I call this one-step thinking. An example is 
given in Fig. 5. I gave these problems in an algebra-
based physics class using clickers at the beginning of the 
second term as a part of a discussion about how to learn 
to think in the class.24  
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The first problem, labeled A, asks, “Given that a light 
and heavy ball fall to the ground at the same time, which 
is being pulled harder by the force of gravity?” The se-
cond rotates the motion from vertical to horizontal, re-
verses the direction of the implication, and asks, “If you 
are pulling a light and heavy object with the same force, 
which will speed up faster (ignoring friction)?”  
Although it seems obvious that the force of gravity on a 
heavier object is bigger than on a light object (after all, 
that is what “heavier” means), half of the students an-
swered the first question saying that creating equal 
speeds required equal pulls on different masses. But 
more than 80% realized that creating equal speeds for a 
heavy and light mass requires more force on the heavier. 
(It doesn’t matter which question I ask first. I get about 
the same result either way.)  
Discussion makes it clear that most of the students who 
answer the falling body question wrong seem to be fram-
ing the task as a “physics recall” problem and as a result 
are not accessing their intuitive sense of how to make 
heavy and light objects move. They see “gravity” in the 
first question and remember from Physics 1, “Oh yeah. 
We had a funny result about falling and the implication 
was that gravity was the same.” They reconstructed a 
memory and did not include in their epistemological 
framing the need to check their memory against their 
intuition. 
 
Fig. 5: Student responses to nearly equivalent questions. 
Their error is not that they don’t know that it takes more 
force to accelerate a heavy object than a light one. Their 
error is they don’t bring that knowledge to bear in this 
particular context. The failure to demand reconciliation 
of the physics they are learning with their everyday ex-
perience is a familiar problem to instructors of introduc-
tory physics and raises serious barriers to our students 
developing good physical intuitions. 
The problem is not only that students do one-step think-
ing in response to a question and get the wrong answer. 
Sometimes the wrong epistemological framing leads 
them to shut down and not even try.  
In my exams, I often give questions that students have 
not seen before, but which they can solve if they know 
the foothold principles we have discussed and how to 
apply them. At the beginning of the term, I tell them that 
they will have to think on exams, but many ignore my 
statement – in part because they are not sure what it 
means. After the first exam in the second semester, a 
student who was new to my class came in to see me be-
cause she was upset at her results. She had barely earned 
a C and was used to straight A’s. She wanted help in 
understanding what she was doing wrong. I began by 
asking her to show me what she had done on the first 
problem – a 5-part short answer problem about forces 
among three charges in a line.† She had missed every 
one. She sighed and said, “I didn’t know any of these 
answers so I just guessed.” I responded, “Well, I don’t 
know what you learned last term. On parts B, C, and D it 
asks for a net force. How did you learn to approach 
that?” She answered, “We did free-body diagrams.” I 
asked her to try that technique. She proceeded to use it 
successfully without any help from me and went on to 
solve every part of the problem quickly and effectively. 
“Oh!” she said. “I’m supposed to figure them out!” From 
that point on, she earned straight A’s in all her exams. 
Her problem was not that she didn’t know the physics 
being tested; she had incorrectly framed the task episte-
mologically. 
Framing 2: P-priming 
The examples in the previous section relied on students’ 
framing a task as being answerable by direct recall from 
memory and, as a result, failing to access resources that 
they have and can use effectively. In this second fram-
ing, students treat a task as being solvable using their 
intuitive physical sense of how the world works (phe-
nomenological primitives20), again without thinking 
carefully about what’s really going on.  
This data comes from the work of Brian Frank.64 It takes 
place in a recitation of our algebra-based physics class 
that had been modified to place more emphasis than usu-
al on epistemology.24 These recitations are run as Tutori-
als in the University of Washington model.65,66 Students 
work in groups of 3-5 facilitated by a teaching assistant 
trained to understand the difficulties the student typically 
encounter and to encourage students to explore their own 
ideas with each other. 
The first lesson of the semester was on the concept of 
instantaneous velocity. We used a standard device 
(shown in Fig. 6). A long thin paper tape (“ticker-tape”) 
is attached to a low friction cart (shown at the left) and 
run through a “tapping device” that taps a sharp point 
onto the tape through a piece of carbon paper at a fixed 
                                                
† http://www.physics.umd.edu/perg/abp/TPProbs/Problems/E/E67.htm  
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rate. The cart is allowed to accelerate slowly down a 
long ramp and the tapping device creates dots on the tape 
whose spacing indicates the cart’s speed. 
The tape is then cut into segments of six dots each. Since 
the cart accelerated slowly, 6 dots (representing about 
two-tenths of a second) look as if they are representing a 
constant speed. A group of 4 students receives four seg-
ment of paper tape as shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
The lesson begins with the TA describing the machine 
that makes the tapes and how it generates them. The first 
question the students are asked in the lesson is: “How 
does the time taken to generate one of the short segments 
compare to the time to generate one of the long ones?”  
Since the marking device taps at a fixed rate, the answer 
is trivial: they each have six dots, so they each took the 
same amount of time to make. But that’s not what the 
students said. Here are some transcripts of our vide-
otapes: 
Group 1  
   S1: Obviously, it takes less time to generate 
the more closely spaced dots. 
Group 2 
   S2: (Reading) “How does the time taken…” 
It’s shorter! (Huh!) 
   S3:  Yeah. Isn’t it pretty much – The shorter 
ones are shorter. 
Group 3  
S4: (Reading) “The time taken to generate 
one of the short segments…” It’s shorter! 
Group 4  
S5: Well it takes less time to generate a short 
piece of paper than it does a long one. 
(pause) I would assume. (pause) I don’t real-
ly know how that thing works. [The last two 
comments are ignored by the rest of the 
group.] 
It’s dramatic watching one group after another give the 
same obviously incorrect answer, confidently and with-
out hesitation. This looks suspiciously like it’s some 
kind of “common misconception”. But the last group we 
quote gives a hint as to what’s going on.  
If we go a bit further into the videos, we find that a few 
questions later the lesson shifts the context. The result is 
that the groups bring a different approach to bear. They 
are asked, “Arrange the paper segments in order by 
speed. How do you know how to arrange them?” Here’s 
a typical response from one of the groups: 
S1: Acceleration! It starts off going slow here, [point-
ing to a short segment] then faster, faster, faster 
[pointing to a long segment]. 
S2: No, no! Faster, then slower, slower, slower! This 
is slow [pointing to a long segment]. 
S1: When it gets faster it gets farther apart. That 
means the paper’s moving faster through it. [ges-
tures] So it’s spaced out farther. 
S2: Wait. Hold on. [gestures to TA] 
S2: [to TA] Is the tapper changing speeds or is the pa-
per moving through it changing speeds? 
TA: The tapper always taps at the same speed.  
S1 and S2 [together and pointing at each other]: 
Ahhh! 
They then proceed to correctly analyze what’s going on. 
We saw this again and again. At the beginning the stu-
dents gave a quick answer – longer tapes take more time, 
shorter ones take less. Just a few minutes later, the light 
dawns and they all get it right (Fig. 8).  
What is changing when the students in these groups shift 
their behavior in response to a (very slightly) changed 
context? I suggest that the easiest way to describe what 
is happening is as epistemological re-framing.  
 
In PER we often have a tendency to refer to common 
errors that students bring into the classroom as “miscon-
ceptions”. I don’t have a problem with this, but I would 
like us to take a finer-grained view. I define a miscon-
ception as a student error that is commonly and reliably 
Fig. 6: Pasco low-friction cart  
and ticker-tape tapper. 
Fig. 7: Samples of ticker tape given to the students. 
Fig. 8: The light dawns. 
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activated in a given context. Adding context encourages 
us to understand what is happening in detail – to consid-
er components of the student’s response, rather than us-
ing the term to close off further consideration of what the 
student is actually bringing to the task. Misconceptions 
can have structure, not just be an irreducible gallstone 
that needs to be excised. Misconceptions can be robust 
and hard to undo, but sometimes they are created on the 
spot and are highly context dependent. Sometimes, they 
contain the structures that can provide their own cure.67 
In our example, at the start of the lesson, many students 
have the epistemological assumption that they will be 
able to generate a correct answer by simply looking at 
the question and drawing the most immediate and natural 
response – essentially by an immediate association with-
out carefully considering the mechanism of what is hap-
pening. What they get is a phenomenological primitive20 
(p-prim): “more is more”, which in this situation they 
map into “a longer tape takes a longer time”. This feels 
right to them (partly because it is easy to generate68) and 
they move on. 
The misconception in this case isn’t actually a misunder-
standing about the nature of velocity; it’s a common 
framing error. The misconception is epistemological 
rather than conceptual: students assume that the answer 
can be generated directly by fast thinking without a care-
ful consideration of the mechanism. In the last two sen-
tences quoted, the student in group 4 expressed a fram-
ing caveat: in effect, “We might have to consider the 
mechanism here.”  
The later questions on the worksheet can’t be answered 
without considering how the cart is moving and the 
mechanism creating the tapes, so a frame shift was need-
ed. This led the students to go back and reconsider (and 
correct) their answer to the first question. (Of course the 
students were also doing “one-step thinking” and in the 
previous example the students were “p-primming” by 
choosing “same means same” in the gravity question. 
But in that case we are emphasizing the failure to active 
the epistemological resource of coherence and here the 
failure to activate the epistemological resource of mech-
anism.) 
Many physics teachers are surprised when our students 
“miss the gorilla in the classroom” and assume they 
didn’t need to think about the mechanism of what’s hap-
pening – especially since the lesson begins with the TA 
describing the mechanism just a minute or two earlier! 
But selective attention can cause students not only to 
focus on particular aspects of a task but also to ignore 
other aspects that their instructors might consider natural 
and critical. 
Framing 3: Rote reasoning 
Our first two framings involved students not thinking 
much – coming up with answers too quickly or not 
bringing to bear things they knew well. But framing er-
rors don’t only occur by students failing to think enough. 
Sometimes they reason long and hard – but still fail to 
bring in relevant things they know. Two examples are 
found in the work of Tuminaro69,70 and Bing.71,72,73 
Tuminaro videotaped students in algebra-based physics 
working on problems in groups. In one example,70 he 
watched a student trying to solve an estimation problem 
in the section on fluids in the last week of the first se-
mester. The problem is shown in Fig. 9.  
The student thought she knew what to do. She looked for 
an equation for pressure and by failing to distinguish 
pressure from difference in pressure, brought up the 
wrong one: pV = nRT (instead of p = p0 + ρgd). She then 
tried to see which variables she knew the value of and 
which needed to be calculated. She wound up making 
some very bizarre statements – such as insisting her 
dorm room should be considered to have a volume of 1 
m3. She failed to identify this as an estimation problem 
in which you are expected to quantify your personal ex-
perience. She felt that any number you needed had to be 
given somewhere in the problem. The only visible vol-
ume was in the density – 1 kg per 1 m3. (This despite the 
fact that the class had done an estimation problem on 
every previous homework assignment.) Her epistemo-
logical stance for this task was what Tuminaro called 
recursive plug-and-chug – an explicit problem-solving 
process that she had learned in high school. It leads to 
successful calculations in many situations, but it does not 
typically include sense-making or deciding whether an 
equation is relevant or meaningful. 
In a second example, Bing studied students working in 
groups in upper-division physics classes. In one exam-
ple,72 he watched a group of half a dozen students solv-
ing a quantum mechanics problem from Griffiths.74 As 
part of studying the role of symmetry in two-particle 
wave functions, they had to calculate the expectation 
value of <x2> in an excited state of the one-dimensional 
particle in a box. One student wrote down the integral 
. 
This is the correct integrand, but with the wrong limits. 
She proceeded to spend more than 15 minutes using a 
variety of tools to try to construct the integral – Mathe-
matica™, analytic integration by parts, an integration 
tool on a TI calculator. Throughout, she showed good 
mathematical thinking and convinced herself (correctly) 
that the integral diverged. A second student was growing 
increasingly uncomfortable. “We’ve done that integral so 
many times... (starts paging through in the book).” Hav-
ing convinced herself with extensive reasoning, she chal-
lenged him to find it. After some time, a third student 
said, “Hey! It’s not negative infinity to infinity…we just 
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have to integrate it over the square well since it’s the 
infinite square well.” Everyone immediately agreed and 
they quickly found the correct solution. Although our 
first student clearly excelled at mathematical reasoning, 
by framing the problem as only a mathematical one, not 
one requiring the blending of physical and mathematical 
knowledge, she wound up on the wrong track for an ex-
tended period of time. Once she was cued to realize the 
physical fact she already knew, she was able to import it 
into the math and quickly do the integral correctly. 
In our first three groups of framing examples, students 
failed to answer a question correctly, not because they 
did not possess the needed tools or understand the criti-
cal concepts; they just didn’t see that they needed to ac-
cess many of the resources they possessed. These 
weren’t conceptual difficulties; they were selective atten-
tion problems – epistemological framing. 
A final epistemological framing shows that higher steps 
in the staircase are relevant as well. This example in-
volves the use (or not) of cross-disciplinary knowledge. 
Framing 4: Disciplinary siloing 
My discussion of this last case will be brief because our 
work on the subject is fairly recent and is still shaking 
down. But I want to include it because it shows how 
broader cultural expectations (from a higher step in the 
staircase) can play a role. I call this particular type of 
framing, disciplinary siloing. It affects both students and 
instructors. In it, students (and faculty) classify particular 
bits of knowledge and types of reasoning as “belonging 
to one particular discipline” and fail (or even actively 
refuse) to call on these resources in the context of other 
disciplines. This is a big topic, so I will not cite specific 
examples, but only given general statements. See the 
references for examples. 
In many universities, a majority of students taking phys-
ics are not physics majors but engineers, biologists, pre-
health-care students, or something else. Recently, my 
research group has been working on how to transform 
introductory physics for biology majors into a course 
that holds value for them and for the instructors in their 
later biology classes.75 As part of this effort, we have 
been holding extensive conversations with biologists,76 
interviewing both students and faculty about their views 
of the relations between physics and biology, and ob-
serving our students both working on physics problems 
in biological contexts77 and exploring biological situa-
tions from a physics point of view.78 
One thing that we have learned from our interdiscipli-
nary conversations: Biology and physics faculty look at 
the goals and approaches towards introductory instruc-
tion in their discipline in dramatically different ways. 
Here are two of the differences we have seen:76 
• Physicists tend to want to express their 
knowledge — even their conceptual knowledge 
— in terms of equations and mathematical rela-
tionships and are accustomed to thinking using 
mathematical manipulations, even about quali-
tative issues. Biologists are much less likely to 
want to do this and may view such activities as 
valueless or even misleading.  
 
• Physicists are fond of “toy models” — highly 
simplified situations that can be carefully and 
completely analyzed mathematically. These be-
come “touchstone examples” that illustrate a 
particular (often mathematical) method or prin-
ciple and serve as metaphors for modeling more 
complex situations. While toy models are 
broadly present in introductory physics courses, 
they also appear in the advanced research litera-
ture. Biologists much prefer to tie their discus-
sions and analyses to real world examples. The 
powerful connections in biology between struc-
ture and function lead them to be highly suspi-
cious of models where the structure appears to 
be “too simplified”.79 
These disciplinary epistemological stances create barri-
ers between physics instructors and their biology stu-
dents, and between physics and biology faculty trying to 
negotiate how to create an effective multidisciplinary 
curriculum. We have a large amount of data supporting 
these claims, including interviews with students in a bi-
ology class (“I don’t like to think of biology in terms of 
numbers and variables…. I can’t do it. It’s just very un-
appealing to me.”80) to Likert-scale attitude surveys of 
biology students in a traditional physics class reporting 
on the value of physics for biology (favorable results fell 
from 57% before the first term to 40% at the end of the 
first term, and to 37% at the end of the second58).  
Although I do not have as extensive data on engineering 
students, I suspect disciplinary siloing occurs there as 
well, with engineering students being much more inter-
ested in “doing things” than with the theoretical princi-
ples that allow them to do those things. The fundamental 
engineering interest in design is rarely reflected in an 
introductory physics course for engineers and I expect 
this creates problems as well. 
The take-home message:  
It’s not just concepts. Framing matters. 
Epistemological framing – what students think is the 
kind of knowledge they are seeking and what they think 
they have to (or are allowed to) use to get it — often 
plays an important role in how they behave in our clas-
ses. If we ignore the issue of epistemological framing, 
we might misinterpret where a common student problem 
lies and have trouble creating an effective lesson — or 
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fail to understand why a particular lesson is (or is not) 
effective. 
Here’s the takeaway message:  
Student responses don’t simply represent activations 
of their stored knowledge. They are dynamically 
created in response to their perception of the task 
and what resources are appropriate to bring to 
bear. As a result, their behavior may have a com-
plex structure. The (often unconscious) choices they 
make as to how to activate, use, and process 
knowledge are often determined by their social and 
cultural expectations (framing). 
We need to keep in mind the possibility that students 
may not just be “wrong”, “not know”, “not understand”, 
or “exhibit difficulties”, but that they may rather be “do-
ing the wrong thing”. 
VI. WHAT HAVING A  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
DOES FOR MY TEACHING 
The shift in perspective to include an awareness of stu-
dents’ control structures – their framing of their immedi-
ate context and the socio-cultural expectations they bring 
to bear – has had profound implications both on the way 
I perceive and interact with my students and on the way I 
carry out my education research. This deserves lots of 
discussion and lots of examples. But since this paper is 
already long enough, I will just mention a few items. 
(For more discussion of these and related issues, see my 
book about teaching81 and my Varenna lectures.6) Here 
are four implications: 
• It makes my responses to student questions more 
effective. 
• It leads me to have more respect for students’ think-
ing and opinions. 
• It encourages me to include “meta-formative evalua-
tions”. 
• It helps me generate hypotheses for research. 
It makes my responses  
to student questions more effective 
Taking a theoretical perspective has made me rethink 
how I provide help to my students. Years ago, if a stu-
dent came into my office hours with a question, I would 
give the best possible answer that I could. I was framing 
my task as if I were still a student, trying to give my in-
structor the best possible answer that I could, to show 
how good a student I was. This made sense at one level. 
I am where I am (a faculty member at a research institu-
tion) because I had been a good student. I knew how to 
play that role.  
Now, my theoretical frame helps me see this as an inap-
propriate role reversal. I shouldn’t have been viewing the 
student’s question from a focus on the content of the 
question. Rather, I should have been trying to answer the 
question, “Why can’t this student, to whom I have taught 
this material, answer this question for herself?” I should 
have been diagnosing her learning difficulty, not answer-
ing the content of her question. Not only did I make a 
framing error, but I now understand that there are many 
problems that might be keeping her from getting the an-
swer on her own, and many of them may have to do with 
framing errors rather than lack of knowledge. Careful 
questioning is needed to identify what’s really going on 
and what help the student needs. My response to the stu-
dent who was unhappy about her exam grade (in the sec-
tion on One-Step Thinking) is an example of how I go 
about this. 
It leads me to have more respect  
for students’ thinking and opinions. 
A second shift in my teaching has been to develop more 
respect for my students’ responses and opinions. Increas-
ingly, I have been giving them more latitude to answer 
my questions in class and have been following up on 
“wrong” answers more persistently. Often I am surprised 
by students’ answers. They sometimes illuminate tacit 
assumptions I am making and have not been aware of.  
In one example, I gave the class a clicker question‡ to 
select the graph of the electrostatic potential in an infi-
nite parallel plate capacitor. Since the E field is constant 
between the plates and 0 outside them, the graph is con-
stant outside the plates and a straight line inside as 
shown in either of the two graphs in figure 10. Students 
are supposed to select one of these two from among 
eight possibilities. This is a standard example and I have 
given it dozens of times in the years I have been teach-
ing. 
 
Some students refused all of the answers offered and 
selected “none of the above.” When I asked them to ex-
plain, one said, “Since all the charges are on atoms, 
when you get close to a charged atom in a plate it should 
shoot up high.” Another said, “When you get far away 
                                                
‡ http://www.physics.umd.edu/perg/abp/TPProbs/Problems/E/E42.htm  
Fig. 10: Possible graphs of the potential  
between two charged capacitor plates. 
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from the plate, on either side, you have to go to zero – 
and it should be symmetric.” I realized that what I 
thought was the “obvious right answer” was only right 
when I made a series of tacit assumptions that I had 
failed to explicate. This resulted in an excellent discus-
sion about the nature of approximations and toy models 
in physics and their value. Since thinking about mecha-
nism, atoms, and how things are built up from the basic 
physics is a part of my (epistemological) educational 
goals, I was extremely pleased with how it worked out. 
It encourages me to include  
“meta-cognitive formative evaluation”. 
Since the theory teaches me that the mind is not always 
to be trusted, it encourages me to include explicit ele-
ments in my class to help students become aware of the 
limitations of their “natural thinking” and to encourage 
them to develop scientific habits of mind. I call this me-
ta-cognitive formative evaluation – an evaluation that 
encourages students to think about their own thinking. 
One way I do this is to give regular “tricky” 10-minute 
quizzes once a week. The quizzes are straightforward 
and solvable short-answer or multiple-choice problems, 
but are set up to lead to the wrong answer if students 
resort to one-step thinking is or ignore mechanism (p-
primming). They often include attractive distractors like 
the questions in the famous concept inventories.82,83 Of-
ten, a question will look like one that students have pre-
viously seen as a clicker question, on the homework, or 
in recitation – but with a change in the situation that 
leads to a change in the answer.  
At first, students complain that these are “unfair” or 
“trick questions.” But these quizzes each don’t count for 
much (1% of the class grade). I stress that our goal is 
formative and is not about coming up with a particular 
answer, but rather in learning how to take a test where 
“thinking is required”. I return the quiz and go over it in 
the next class, presenting the distribution of answers 
chosen and draw out discussions of why students picked 
the wrong answers. Often, these are the most valuable 
discussions in a week, and occasionally, have led to a 
deep discussion of the physics that takes up the entire 
rest of the class. Students often report these discussions 
as being extremely valuable.§ An example of such a quiz 
question is given in Fig. 11. About 40% of students 
chose the incorrect answers [a] and [b]. 
We sometimes write the symbol “g” to stand for 
the value 9.8 m/s2. What does this stand for?  
Give all the answers that are correct (but you 
will lose points for any wrong ones you include).  
[a] The magnitude of the acceleration of any 
object feeling a gravitational force. 
                                                
§ For more meta-cognitive formative evaluation methods, see refs. [24] 
and [81].  
[b] The gravitational force on any object near 
the surface of the earth. 
[c] The magnitude of the acceleration of any 
object in free fall. 
[d] The gravitational field strength (same as 9.8 
N/kg). 
[e] None of the above. 
Fig. 11: A quiz question that students found challenging. 
Some of these items are insufficiently specified. Items 
[c] and [d] are correct if you assume you are near the 
surface of the earth – but that isn’t mentioned. My hope 
is that some student will raise the issue and I will be 
“forced” to accept answer [e] as correct. This encourages 
students to think about their tests, think about their think-
ing, and challenge my grading. This is a much better 
situation for epistemological development than simply 
looking at it and saying, “Oh. I got it wrong. I better 
memorize this answer.” 
It helps me generate hypotheses for research 
My theoretical framework is equally valuable on my 
research side. When we apply our folk theories of teach-
ing and learning – often without being explicit about it84 
– we can misread what is going on. When a lot of stu-
dents make the same error, I might attribute it to a seri-
ous misconception – something that we need to help the 
students “unlearn”. But having the two-level resources 
framework in my pocket leads me to hypothesize that the 
problem may not be what the students know about the 
physics, but about what knowledge they have that they 
activate in the moment. These two problems can lead to 
identical symptoms (student responses to exam ques-
tions), but they require dramatically different cures.  
Even asking the students to “explain their reasoning” 
may not be sufficient to disambiguate these two prob-
lems. For example, if students are p-primming, they may 
not have a “reasoning” that they can explain. A p-prim is 
just an answer that “feels right” from lots of everyday 
experience.20 If asked to explain their reasoning, students 
may generate a reason after the fact, providing not the 
reasoning behind their answer but a reason they think 
may satisfy the instructor. Disambiguation can require 
subtler observations, such as think-aloud protocols.  
A method I have found very valuable is watching stu-
dents solve problems in groups. When they disagree with 
each other, they articulate their reasoning, trying to con-
vince their peers of their answer.61 To see how this ap-
proach plays out in specific examples, see the many pa-
pers in the Resources/KiP bibliographies.22 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The two-level theoretical Resources Framework that 
looks to understand student thinking through making 
sense of association structures in their knowledge and 
finding control structures that manage the access to those 
structures is not intended as a closed or “final theory”. 
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Rather, it should be looked at as a “foothold idea” – a set 
of principles for going forward and building theory. As 
such, it should become an element in the partnered dance 
of theory and experiment, each providing support for 
each other, sometimes one partner leading, and some-
times the other. 
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